Counter unmanned aerial systems

The outcome should contribute to:

• consolidating and validating doctrine and CONOPS in the field of C-UAS;
• developing a comprehensive C-UAS capability for the EU and EDF associated countries;
• reducing the minimum reaction time compared with current systems;
• enhancing situation awareness and protection of critical areas and strategic assets;
• ensuring interoperability with existing security and defence systems in order to easily adapt to current monitoring systems;
• further increasing the effectiveness of C-UAS technologies/systems to be able to better counter the current and future UAS threat (including the use of MOTS UAS and swarms).

Unmanned aerial system (UAS), including cheap commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and easy to assemble UAS components are widely available and their popularity is even growing. Traditional surveillance systems often fail to cope with these flying objects because of their characteristics. Indeed their low speed make them challenging to detect with conventional radars. Their low altitude allows them to hide amongst trees or behind natural or artificial obstacles, and their very small radio-frequency (RF)/radar cross-section (RCS), as well as their thermal and acoustic signatures make them difficult to detect. Additionally the high manoeuvrability of some machines makes their movement hard to track once detected, and their increasing on-board processing capabilities (e.g. automated and vision-based navigation, use of artificial intelligence) makes them more resilient to some counter-UAS (C-UAS) systems that rely on RF detection and jamming.

In addition, current C-UAS technology is largely ineffective against military grade UAS (such as loitering munitions), swarms and flocks of drones and threats that may emerge in the short to medium term, also considering that the use of cellular networks (4G, 5G or beyond) will increase the speed, stability and immediacy of intercommunication between aircraft and control stations. Moreover, while some systems may be effective against a variety of UAS threats, the costs of engagement may be prohibitive to counter large-scale attacks.

Specific objective

The specific objective of this topic is to:

• tackle safety and security concerns (e.g. malevolent users attempting deliberately hostile missions such as the use of explosive payloads, ISR);
• consider the various threats in their environmental and operational context as mitigation options may vary from different scenarios (e.g. depending on the size of the area to protect, the value of the unit to protect, the reaction time required and the need to minimise fratricide and collateral damages);
• provide a suite of solutions to comply with a broad set of rules of engagement (ROEs), each adapted to the surrounding environment and the operational scenarios (including the transition from peace-time to war-time), including from a sensing perspective;
• cover fixed (i.e. continuous protection of Forward Operating Bases (FOB), critical infrastructures, 24/7, at reasonable operational and maintenance costs), deployed (i.e. quick deployment with minimum logistic support, as well as rapid integration of additional sensors and effectors within a recognised open architecture, for tactical military activities as well as civil events) and mobile (i.e. protection of mobile units/elements) applications;
• include a set of various C-UAS capabilities, such as navigation systems spoofing, RF jamming, kinetic effectors (soft/hard with lethal or non-lethal effects), catch or hit-to-kill by a swarm subset or direct energy weapons (e.g. high-power lasers and/or microwaves);
• improve identification and classification capabilities of the system.

The proposals must address the development of a C-UAS system, from a detailed design (i.e. critical design review) up to a system prototype to be tested and qualified in relevant defence operational scenarios, demonstrating its ability to:

• with a selection of passive and active sensors, detect, track, classify, identify, support decision making and counter class I UAS (single and/or multi-UAS) through an optimal selection and activation of relevant effectors using multiple technologies;
• ensure effective protection of critical defence infrastructure, installations and assets;
• operate with limited impact on existing communications or position and navigation infrastructures.

In addition, the proposals may address other operational scenarios, if deemed relevant.

Types of activities

The following table lists the types of activities which are eligible for this topic, and whether they are mandatory or optional (see Article 10(3) EDF Regulation):

The proposals must cover at least the following tasks as part of the mandatory qualification activities:

• the proposals must address the qualification of the prototype to be developed, based on use cases jointly agreed by the supporting Member States and EDF associated countries (Norway);
• in particular, the proposals must address the provision of drawings, reports, analyses, certification plan and data in view of future certification of the system by the supporting Member States and EDF associated countries (Norway) authorities.

In addition, the proposals must substantiate synergies and complementarity with activities described in the call topic EDIDP-CUAS-2020 Counter Unmanned Air Systems (UASs) capabilities.

Moreover:

• projects addressing activities referred to in point (d) above must be based on harmonised defence capability requirements jointly agreed by at least two Member States or EDF associated countries (or, if studies within the meaning of point (c) are still needed to define the requirements, at least on the joint intent to agree on them)
• projects addressing activities referred to in points (e) to (h) above, must be:
  • supported by at least two Member States or EDF associated countries that intend to procure the final product or use the technology in a coordinated manner, including through joint procurement

and

• • based on common technical specifications jointly agreed by the Member States or EDF associated countries that are to co-finance the action or that intend to jointly procure the final product or to jointly use the technology (or, if design within the meaning of point (d) is still needed to define the specifications, at least on the joint intent to agree on them).

Functional requirements

The proposed product and technologies should meet the following functional requirements:

1. The C-UAS system should include battlefield management features, providing for the following capabilities:

• ensure effectiveness of the protection of moving units and assets (e.g. ground formations, convoys, ships located in the vicinity of a harbour or coastal patrolling);
• facilitate the interaction of C-UAS system with security and defence systems for fixed, deployed and mobile assets;
• consider non-static, effector-dependent danger areas in order to reduce risk of blue-on-blue or collateral damage, when protecting groups of moving objects (e.g. convoys, formations);
• ensure robustness and high availability, without being saturated in case of multiple threats (i.e. either single or multiple UAS units, either uncoordinated or operating as a team or as a single system, including swarms);
• provide an extended range of operational performances (e.g. extended ranges for surveillance, detection, identification and neutralisation) to face possible improvements of UAS threats;
• require minimum operator effort for decision making;
• neutralise the threat with focus on semi-autonomous (or even manual) technical solutions (HITL);
• in critical scenarios, where extremely high tempo and/or high threat volume prohibit the use of human sound judgement, provide options for temporarily allowing automatic C-UAS engagements with specified effectors in defined areas, within the LOAC and relevant ROE;
• offer all-weather, 24/7 operational capability, in a wide variety of climate conditions;
• provide simulation and training features in realistic scenarios;
• provide real-time playback functions for mission analysis, training and other purposes;
• require limited logistic support for deployment and maintenance.

1. Regarding command and control (C2), the C-UAS system should be able to:

• plan and monitor subsystems missions and conditions;
• merge information from heterogeneous sensors;
• report about any internal or external elements that could affect the system performances;
• evaluate the possible engagement approaches to the operator, coordinate the engagement approach selected by the operator and report on the resulting outcomes;
• balance the autonomous processing of information across the adopted sensors and timely report to a central Battle Management/C2 system in order to reduce operational manpower load and bottlenecks;
• generate, disseminate and update real-time operational picture and alerts;
• integrate multilayer C2 system with cross-security-domain approach;
• allow subsystems dynamic deployment and multi-instance integration;
• provide a range of selective engagement and mitigation alternatives with the ability to evaluate mission success probabilities and potential resulting drawbacks;
• compute success probability, time to complete the neutralisation and drawback probabilities, depending on the characteristics of the effectors, for each of the possible neutralisation approaches;
• integrate and connect all the sensors and the effectors in a local C2 station;
• implement data fusion and automatic procedures and rules in order to focus human operations on action, resources coordination and cooperation. A user-friendly interface should be provided.

1. Regarding sensors, C-UAS should:

• enable omnidirectional detection (e.g. rotating or staring) while also being capable of limiting the detection to a sector of choice;
• include the capability of detection for non-cooperative UAS, including autonomous, in the suite of sensors, as well as various technologies for detection and tracking (e.g. EO/IR, RF, acoustic);
• provide dynamic scalability of sensors and effectors using communication protocols that allow plug-and-play deployment.

1. In terms of data and information processing, the proposed solution should:

• enable machine learning to allow using recorded signals or signatures in order to enhance the performance of target recognition and identification;
• integrate, process and display different information sources for classification/identification (e.g. sensors information, ACO, civil UTM/ATM information…).

1. In terms of interfaces and interoperability, the C-UAS system should:

• be based on an open, flexible, modular and scalable architecture based on a plug-and-play component approach which allows deployment of specific configurations adapted to the threat scenarios;
• provide standard interfaces and interoperability with relevant foreseen UAS systems (e.g. U-space) and higher air defence C2 elements or other units.