Self-protection systems

With reference to currently available self-protection systems, the outcome is expected to contribute to:

• increasing coverage in term of threat types (e.g. new generation seekers, multiple homing threats, networked LPI radar systems, new generation directed energy weapons and loitering munitions, hostile fires/small calibre, RPG);
• ensuring EU autonomy in the survivability capability;
• versatility by covering a wide range of platforms and saving costs in integration, installation and maintenance, as well as specific development through modular design.

The main objective of the next generation self-protection systems (SPS) is to increase survivability of fixed-wing and rotary-wing, combat or non-combat aircraft in hostile environments.

SPS is to face a wide, heterogeneous and evolving spectrum of hostile and directly threatening systems of surveillance, as well as to prioritise risks in the operational area and select the proper reaction mode through a network of distributed capabilities exploiting sensor nodes of various type inter/intra platforms. It should be reconfigurable depending on the mission and the platform targeted. It should also be able to self-adapt while operating, based on scenario monitoring and mission assets availability.

Specific objective

When operating in semi-permissive or even non-permissive environments, fixed- and rotary- wing platforms face a large spectrum of hostile systems of surveillance and direct threats, which are continuously improving their technology and effectiveness.

Recent events in Ukraine and Syria clearly call for not neglecting any high intensity scenario and question the current self-protection capabilities of fixed- and rotary-wing, combat and non-combat platforms. Surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles with a wide range of guiding systems (RF, optronics) and a wide range of associated surveillance/warning systems are to be considered, as well as hostile fires and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).

The specific objective is to develop an enhanced SPS able to protect against:

• direct threats (e.g. missiles, loitering munition, RPG, etc.);
• indirect threats (e.g. surveillance/acquisition/tracking systems also with Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) radar capability;
• new proliferating types of threats, such as those in the field of loitering munitions, directed energy weapons (DEW) and cyber electromagnetic activity (CEMA) capabilities.

The proposals must address the design, prototyping and testing of a new generation of integrated self-protection system, designed to protect both fixed- and rotary-wing, combat and non-combat platforms, with very high efficiency, in view of allowing the usage of these platforms for mission accomplishment even in contested airspace.

Types of activities

The following table lists the types of activities which are eligible for this topic, and whether they are mandatory or optional (see Article 10(3) EDF Regulation):

The proposals must cover at least the following tasks as part of the mandatory activities:

• design of a detailed self-protection system (Critical Design Review - CDR);
• prototyping and testing (on board of existing end-user platforms) of a self-protection system modular version, integrating sensors and effectors of sufficient technological maturity (e.g. full wideband digital radar warning receiver, multispectral threat warner);
• testing to be conducted either on a large and fixed wing aircraft or on a medium size helicopter in order to demonstrate:
  • versatility of the system architecture on fixed- and rotary-wing assets;
  • ability of the proposed system to meet the high-level requirements as jointly agreed by the supporting Member States and EDF associated countries (Norway);
  • feasibility of collaborative self-protection capability allowing the exchange of data with cooperative platforms, to perform sensing and jamming, in order to achieve better performances than a stand-alone platform, taking into consideration the possible level of classification of such data;
• technical maturation of lower technological readiness level (TRL) sensors and effectors, leading to at least TRL 7.

In addition, the proposals must substantiate synergies and complementarity with activities described in the call topic EDIDP-ACC-SPS-2020 Self-protection systems for fixed and rotary wing aircraft.

Moreover:

• projects addressing activities referred to in point (d) above must be based on harmonised defence capability requirements jointly agreed by at least two Member States or EDF associated countries (or, if studies within the meaning of point (c) are still needed to define the requirements, at least on the joint intent to agree on them)
• projects addressing activities referred to in points (e) to (h) above, must be:
  • supported by at least two Member States or EDF associated countries that intend to procure the final product or use the technology in a coordinated manner, including through joint procurement

and

• • based on common technical specifications jointly agreed by the Member States or EDF associated countries that are to co-finance the action or that intend to jointly procure the final product or to jointly use the technology (or, if design within the meaning of point (d) is still needed to define the specifications, at least on the joint intent to agree on them).

Functional requirements

The proposed product and technologies should meet the following functional requirements:

1. The system should:

• be designed to equip both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft with appropriate modularity to cope with specific threat list/platform signature/platform kinematics/platform installation and integration constraints;
• be based on an open architecture and international standards widely used in this domain (hardware interfaces, software interfaces, protocols and communication links);
• protect its own sensitive data and software (e.g. from cyberattacks);
• embed compatibility management features to ensure compatibility with other emitters and receivers on board the platform and/or other aircraft involved in a mission;
• have ways to remove any doubt concerning the source of the alleged hostile system, before alerting the crew;
• provide for, but not limited to, an automatic mode elaborating suggested countermeasures, including coordinated countermeasures (e.g. manoeuvres, expendables and jamming) that can be implemented without a man in the loop if automatic mode is selected;
• be compatible with new-generation platform systems architecture (e.g. next generation rotorcraft, future mid-size tactical cargo) and legacy platforms.

1. Regarding protection against direct threats, the system should:

• detect that the aircraft or other aircraft they are flying with, are being engaged by direct threats and provide warning to the mission and/or avionics systems of the aircraft;
• protect the aircraft from direct threats providing identification of such direct threats and elaborating the appropriate coordinate countermeasures;
• provide features to counter the direct threats elaborating the most appropriate combination of countermeasures (e.g. expendables, jamming, directed energy weapon and manoeuvres);
• detect incoming threats, perform classification and suggest optimal combination of reactions in terms of countermeasures and escape manoeuvres considering assets available on the single platform and considering the availability of collaborative platforms;
• gather intelligence regarding the direct threats characteristics and fire posts locations and be able to detect changes in those characteristics and locations;
• classify threats, to support sensor system behaviour in complex, congested, cluttered, contested, connected and constrained operational electromagnetic environment.

1. Regarding indirect threat detection and protection, the system should:

• gather and record indications that the aircraft or other aircraft they are flying with, are detected by any hostile surveillance systems and provide warning through the mission and/or avionics systems of the aircraft;
• detect that the aircraft or other aircraft of the group are being tracked by any hostile systems and provide warning to the mission and/or avionics systems of the aircraft;
• provide features to disturb the detection and tracking by both passive and active surveillance systems of the enemy;
• suggest, considering the availability of collaborative platforms, the optimal combination of disturbances to interrupt the acquisition chain of enemy sensors;
• gather intelligence regarding indirect threats characteristics and locations and be able to detect differences with expected Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) or changes with reference to previously recorded EOB;
• perform collaborative self-protection with the ability to share collected information with cooperative platforms in networked operations, exchanging ESM and ECM data with other platforms to achieve a faster and more accurate operational situational awareness than with a single platform, taking into account the possible level of classification of such data;
• classify indirect threats during the development of the system, to support sensor system behaviour in complex environment.